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Town of Greece v. Galloway
12-696
Ruling Below: Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20 (2nd Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 2013
WL 2149803.
Residents of Town of Greece, New York Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens brought civil
rights action suit against the town and Town Supervisor John Auberger in the United States
District Court for the Western District of New York. The town opened every town board
meeting with a prayer; specifically, almost exclusively Christian prayers. Residents asserted that
aspects of the town prayer practice violated the Establishment Clause. The district court granted
the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs appealed.
Questions Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that a legislative prayer
practice violates the Establishment Clause notwithstanding the absence of discrimination in the
selection of prayer-givers or forbidden exploitation of the prayer opportunity.

Susan GALLOWAY and Linda Stephens, Plaintiffs–Appellants,
v.
TOWN OF GREECE, Defendant–Appellee
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
Decided on May 17, 2012
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
CALABRESI, Circuit Judge
Since 1999, the Town of Greece, New York,
has begun its Town Board meetings with a
short prayer. In 2008, town residents Susan
Galloway and Linda Stephens brought suit
against the town and Town Supervisor John
Auberger in the United States District Court
for the Western District of New York,
asserting that aspects of this prayer practice
violated the Establishment Clause. The
district court granted the defendants' motion
for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs
appeal. We hold that, on this record, the

district court erred in rejecting the plaintiffs'
argument that the prayer practice
impermissibly affiliated the town with a
single creed, Christianity. Accordingly, we
REVERSE and REMAND for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
For the most part, the facts at issue are not
disputed, [although] the parties dispute how
to characterize the facts…
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The Town of Greece is a municipal
corporation located in Monroe County, New
York, just outside the city of Rochester. As
of the 2000 census, the town had roughly
94,000 residents. An elected, five-member
Town Board governs the town and conducts
official business at monthly public meetings.
At these meetings, the Board votes on
proposed ordinances, conducts public
hearings, bestows citizenship awards, swears
in new town employees, and the like.
Residents and town employees attend Town
Board meetings to monitor and participate in
these aspects of town governance. At times,
children are among the residents attending
town meetings; members of Boy Scout
troops and other student groups have led the
Pledge of Allegiance, and high school
students may fulfill a state-mandated civics
requirement necessary for graduation by
going to Board meetings.
Before 1999, Town Board meetings began
with a moment of silence. That year, at
Auberger's direction, the town began
inviting local clergy to offer an opening
prayer. Typically, Auberger has called each
meeting to order, the Town Clerk has called
the roll of Board members, and Auberger
has then asked the audience to rise for the
Pledge of Allegiance. After the audience has
been seated following the Pledge, Auberger
has introduced the month's prayer-giver,
who has delivered the prayer over the
Board's public address system. Prayer-givers
have often asked members of the audience
to participate by bowing their heads,
standing, or joining in the prayer. After the
prayer's conclusion, Auberger has typically
thanked prayer-givers for being the town's
“chaplain of the month,” at times also

presenting them with a plaque. The town has
consistently listed the prayer in each
meeting's official minutes.
Between 1999 and June 2010, when the
record in this litigation closed, the town did
not adopt any formal policy regarding (a)
the process for inviting prayer-givers, (b) the
permissible content of prayers, or (c) any
other aspect of its prayer practice. The town
claims that anyone may request to give an
invocation, including adherents of any
religion, atheists, and the nonreligious, and
that it has never rejected such a request. The
town also asserts that it does not review the
language of prayers before they are
delivered, and that it would not censor an
invocation, no matter how unusual or
offensive its content. When Galloway and
Stephens complained about the town's
prayer practice in 2007, the town explained
the above-mentioned practices. The town
acknowledges, however, that it has not
publicized to town residents that anyone
may volunteer to deliver prayers or that any
type of invocation would be permissible.
In practice, Christian clergy members have
delivered nearly all of the prayers relevant to
this litigation, and have done so at the town's
invitation…. In 2008, after Galloway and
Stephens had begun complaining to the town
about its prayer practice, non-Christians
delivered the prayer at four of the twelve
Town Board meetings. A Wiccan priestess
and the chairman of the local Baha'i
congregation each delivered one of these
prayers, and a lay Jewish man delivered the
remaining two. The town invited the Wiccan
priestess and the lay Jewish man after they
inquired about delivering prayers; it appears
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that the town invited the Baha'i chairman
without receiving such an inquiry. However,
between January 2009 and June 2010, when
the record closed, all the prayer-givers were
once again invited Christian clergy.
Although the town did not adopt, prior to
June 2010, a formal policy concerning the
selection of prayer-givers, it developed a
more or less standard procedure. Three
successive employees at the town's Office of
Constituent Services had responsibility for
inviting clergy to deliver prayers. The
employee first charged with this task
initially solicited clergy by telephoning, at
various times, all the religious organizations
listed in the town's Community Guide, a
publication of the Greece Chamber of
Commerce. Thereafter, this employee, Linda
Sofia, compiled a “Town Board Chaplain”
list containing the names of individuals who
had accepted invitations to give prayers.
Sofia and the two employees who succeeded
her in this role testified that they worked
their way down the list, calling clergy about
a week before each Town Board meeting
until they found someone willing to give the
prayer. They also testified that they updated
the list periodically based on requests from
community members and on new listings in
the Community Guide and a local
newspaper, the Greece Post.
Until 2008, the “Town Board Chaplain” list
contained only Christian organizations and
clergy. Religious congregations in the town
are primarily Christian. Galloway and
Stephens have both lived in or near Greece
for more than thirty years, and both testified
that they were unaware of any non-Christian
places of worship in the town. In the district

court, the plaintiffs introduced a map
indicating the presence of a Buddhist temple
in the town as well as several Jewish
synagogues located just outside the town.
There is no indication, however, that these
organizations were listed in the Community
Guide or the Greece Post….
In all, there were roughly 130 different
invocations between 1999 and June 2010, of
which more than 120 are contained within
the record. The invocations in the record
typically gave thanks for aspects of the life
of the town and requested assistance with
the ongoing project of town governance.
After being introduced, prayer-givers tended
to begin with some variant of “let us pray,”
and then to speak about the matters for
which “we” pray, ostensibly on behalf of the
audience or the town more broadly.
Members of the audience and the Board
have bowed their heads, stood, and
participated in the prayers by saying
“Amen.” On a few occasions, some
members of the Town Board have made the
sign of the cross.
A substantial majority of the prayers in the
record contained uniquely Christian
language. Roughly two-thirds contained
references to “Jesus Christ,” “Jesus,” “Your
Son,” or the “Holy Spirit.” Within this
subset, almost all concluded with a
statement that the prayer had been given in
Jesus Christ's name. Typically, prayer-givers
stated something like, “In Jesus's name we
pray,” or “We ask this in Christ's name.”
Some prayer-givers elaborated further,
describing Christ as “our Savior,” “God's
only son,” “the Lord,” or part of the Holy
Trinity….
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The remaining third of the prayers spoke in
more generically theistic terms. Christian
clergy delivered prayers referring to “God of
all creation,” “Heavenly Father,” and God's
“kingdom of Heaven.” The lay Jewish
prayer-giver spoke of “God,” the “Father,”
and the “Lord”; he also referenced, at one
point, “the songs of David, your servant.”
The Baha'i prayer-giver referred generally to
“God,” concluding his prayer with the
Baha'i greeting, “Alláh–u–Abhá,” which
loosely means “God the All Glorious.”
Finally, the Wiccan priestess invoked
Athena and Apollo; she stated these were
fitting deities given the Town's name.
Galloway and Stephens attended numerous
Town Board meetings after the town
initiated its prayer practice in 1999. In
September 2007, they began complaining to
town officials about the prayer practice,
sometimes during public comment periods
at Board meetings. In these informal
complaints, the plaintiffs raised two types of
objections, though they did not distinguish
them as such. First, they asserted that the
prayers aligned the town with Christianity.
Second, they argued that the prayers were
sectarian rather than secular. Town officials
met with the plaintiffs and expressed the
town's position that it would accept any
volunteer to deliver the prayers and that it
would not police the content of prayers. The
town did not make any public response to
the plaintiffs' complaints, however. Nor did
it make any comment concerning the prayer
delivered at an October 2007 meeting,
which described objectors to the town's
prayer practice as a “minority ... ignorant of
the history of our country.”

In February 2008, the plaintiffs filed suit
against the town and Auberger, challenging
aspects of the prayer practice under the
Establishment Clause. They made two
arguments before the district court: (1) that
the town's procedure for selecting prayergivers
unconstitutionally
preferred
Christianity over other faiths, and (2) that
the prayer practice was impermissibly
“sectarian.” In support of their position, the
plaintiffs reiterated the same objections they
had raised before the Town Board prior to
filing suit. They claimed, as an initial matter,
that the prayer practice aligned the town
with Christianity, and that it therefore
established a particular religion. They also
pointed out that the prayer practice
employed language unique to specific
religious sects, and asserted that in so doing
it established religion generally. The
plaintiffs again did not distinguish between
these arguments, nor have they done so on
appeal.
The district court, on cross-motions for
summary judgment, entered judgment for
the defendants. At the outset, the district
court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against
Auberger as redundant of their claims
against the town. After holding that the
plaintiffs had Article III standing to sue the
town, the district court turned to the merits
of their two arguments. As to the plaintiffs'
challenge regarding the town's prayer
selection process, the district court held that
the plaintiffs had failed to advance any
credible evidence that town employees
intentionally excluded representatives of
particular faiths. As to the plaintiffs'
contention regarding the sectarian content of
the prayers, the district court held that, under

5

binding Supreme Court case law, the
Establishment Clause does not foreclose
denominational
prayers.
The
court
concluded for these, and for a number of
case-specific reasons, that the plaintiffs had
failed to show that the town's prayer practice
had the effect of establishing the Christian
religion.
II. DISCUSSION
This appeal presents a narrow subset of the
questions raised before the district court.
Galloway and Stephens do not assert that the
district court erred in dismissing their claims
against Auberger. They have, moreover,
expressly abandoned the argument that the
town intentionally discriminated against
non-Christians in its selection of prayergivers. Accordingly, the only live issue on
appeal is whether the district court erred in
rejecting the plaintiffs' assertion that the
town's prayer practice had the effect, even if
not the purpose, of establishing religion.
We review a grant of summary judgment de
novo….
A.
As far as we are aware, this is the first
instance in which this court has had
occasion to consider the validity of a
legislative prayer practice under the
Establishment Clause. Our analysis must
begin with Marsh v. Chambers, the only
Supreme Court decision cited to us that has
ruled on the constitutionality of legislative
prayer. Marsh held that the Nebraska
legislature's practice of opening its sessions
with a prayer, delivered by a state-employed
clergyman, did not violate the Establishment

Clause. In so holding, Marsh did not employ
the three-pronged test the Court had
adopted, eleven years earlier, in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, for
Establishment
Clause
cases. Rather, the Marsh Court conducted a
largely historical analysis, looking to the
“unique history” of legislative prayer in
America before turning to the particulars of
the Nebraska Legislature's chaplaincy
program.
The Court first held that state-funded
legislative prayer does not necessarily run
afoul of the Establishment Clause….
Turning to Nebraska's practice, the Court
dismissed three concerns raised by the state
legislator who was plaintiff in the case.
First, it rejected the argument that the
sixteen-year tenure of the legislative
chaplain, Robert E. Palmer, had “the effect
of giving preference to his religious
views.” The evidence, the Court noted,
suggested that Palmer was reappointed
because of his performance and indicated
that guest chaplains and substitutes had
officiated at various times. The Court held
that “[a]bsent proof that the chaplain's
reappointment
stemmed
from
an
impermissible motive,” Palmer's long tenure
did not “in itself” violate the Establishment
Clause.
Second, the Court rejected the claim that
Palmer's compensation from public funds
conflicted with the Establishment Clause….
Third, the Court rejected the argument that
the “Judeo–Christian” content of the prayers
established religion. In describing the facts
underlying this portion of the plaintiff's
complaint, the Court reported that Palmer
6

had characterized his prayers as “
‘nonsectarian,’ ‘Judeo Christian,’ and with
‘elements of the American civil religion.’
” It also pointed out that “[a]lthough some
of his earlier prayers were often explicitly
Christian, Palmer removed all references to
Christ after a 1980 complaint from a Jewish
legislator.” In responding to plaintiff's
argument, the Court reasoned that “[t]he
content of the prayer is not of concern to
judges where, as here, there is no indication
that the prayer opportunity has been
exploited to proselytize or advance any one,
or to disparage any other, faith or
belief.” For these reasons, the Court
concluded, it was not necessary for it “to
embark on a sensitive evaluation or to parse
the content of a particular prayer.”
Six years later, however, in a case that did
not involve a challenge to legislative prayer,
the Supreme Court suggested that legislative
prayers invoking particular sectarian beliefs
may, on the basis of those references alone,
violate the Establishment Clause. The
decision, County of Allegheny v. American
Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, rejected
the
argument
that Marsh's historical analysis validated a
city's holiday crèche display. The Court
wrote: “However history may affect the
constitutionality of nonsectarian references
to religion by the government, history
cannot legitimate practices that demonstrate
the government's allegiance to a particular
sect or creed.”
Marsh, it reasoned,
recognized that history could not justify
current practices “that have the effect of
affiliating the government with any one
specific faith or belief.”…

As read by Allegheny, Marsh has remained a
fixed point within the High Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Three
years later, in striking down a public school
district's practice of including prayer in its
graduation
ceremonies,
the
Court
distinguished Marsh in light of “[i]nherent
differences between the public school
system and a session of a state legislature.”
In doing so, it pointed specifically to the
difference between “[t]he influence and
force of a formal exercise in a school
graduation” as against a legislative session.
More recently, in noting that “Establishment
Clause doctrine lacks the comfort of
categorical
absolutes,”
the
Court
invoked Marsh as an instance in which it
had “found good reason to hold
governmental action legitimate even where
its manifest purpose was presumably
religious.”
B.
Various circuit court decisions, drawing on
the Court's language in Allegheny, have
questioned the validity of all forms of
“sectarian” prayers. In the most recent of
these, Judge Wilkinson wrote for the Fourth
Circuit
that Marsh and Allegheny, read
together, seek both to acknowledge that
legislative prayer can “solemnize the
weighty task of governance” and to
minimize the risks of “sectarian strife” such
prayer may generate by requiring that
invocations “embrace a non-sectarian
ideal.”
To the extent that these circuit cases stand
for the proposition that a given legislative
prayer practice, viewed in its entirety, may
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not advance a single religious sect, we
cannot disagree. Under Marsh, legislative
prayers may not be “exploited to proselytize
or advance any one, or to disparage any
other, faith or belief.” It is also clear,
under Allegheny, that legislative prayers
may not “have the effect of affiliating the
government with any one specific faith or
belief.”
Joyner, Hinrichs, and Stein might
be read simply to reiterate these standards,
rather
than
to
construe Marsh
and Allegheny as precluding denominational
content in any individual prayer. Construed
in this fashion, the distinction between
sectarian and nonsectarian prayers merely
serves as a shorthand, albeit a potentially
confusing one, for the prohibition on
religious advancement or affiliation outlined
in Marsh and Allegheny.
To the extent that these circuit cases stand
instead for the proposition that the
Establishment
Clause
precludes
all
legislative
invocations
that
are
denominational in nature, however, we
cannot agree. The line between sectarian and
nonsectarian prayers, though perhaps the
least defective among various possible
distinctions that can be drawn in this area,
runs into two sizable doctrinal problems.
First, the Supreme Court has explicitly
rejected
the
notion
that
the
government “may establish an official or
civic religion as a means of avoiding the
establishment of a religion with more
specific creeds.” Admittedly, Lee,which
postdated both Marsh and Allegheny, did not
involve legislative prayer. But its language
was seemingly unequivocal. The Lee Court
held that the defendant public school district

had violated the Establishment Clause when
it advised a rabbi that his prayers at the
school's graduation ceremony “should be
nonsectarian.” A state-imposed requirement
that
all
legislative
prayers
be
nondenominational, the Court reasoned,
begins to sound like the establishment of “an
official or civic religion.” Indeed, Lee made
express its disagreement with the Sixth
Circuit's contrary language in Stein. The
problem with such civic religious statements
lies, in part, in the danger that such efforts to
secure religious “neutrality” may produce “a
brooding and pervasive devotion to the
secular and a passive, or even active,
hostility to the religious.” Under the First
Amendment, the government may not
establish a vague theism as a state religion
any more than it may establish a specific
creed.
The second difficulty with the simple
sectarian/nonsectarian approach seemingly
adopted by some circuits is that the
touchstone
of
our
analysis
must
be Marsh, which is hard to read, even in
light
of Allegheny, as
saying
that
denominational prayers, in and of
themselves, violate the Establishment
Clause. It is true that Allegheny pointed out
that the prayers in Marsh did not have “the
effect of affiliating the government with any
one specific faith or belief .... because the
particular chaplain had ‘removed all
references to Christ.’ ” But this does not
mean that any single denominational prayer
has the forbidden effect of affiliating the
government with any one faith. A series of
denominational prayers, each delivered in
the name of a different sect, could hardly be
perceived as having this effect. At any rate,

8

the chaplain's categorization of the prayers
in Marsh as “nonsectarian” was plainly
contestable with respect to prayers delivered
prior to the 1980 complaint….
Accordingly, our inquiry cannot look solely
to whether the town's legislative prayer
practice contained sectarian references. We
must ask, instead, whether the town's
practice, viewed in its totality by an
ordinary, reasonable observer, conveyed the
view that the town favored or disfavored
certain religious beliefs. In other words, we
must ask whether the town, through its
prayer practice, has established particular
religious beliefs as the more acceptable
ones, and others as less acceptable. This
inquiry, for its part, must be made in the
light of the particular prayer practice upheld
in Marsh and addressed in Allegheny. As a
result, it is clear, for example, that the
longstanding appointment of a single
Christian
clergyman
does
not, in
itself, convey the prohibited favoritism, and
the same is apparently true of “Judeo–
Christian” prayers that make no reference to
Christ. Beyond that, however, any number
of different legislative prayer practices could
be read to yield any number of messages—
acceptable or forbidden—about religion.
C.
Within these confines, we see “no testrelated substitute for the exercise of legal
judgment.” In Marsh, as we have noted, the
Supreme
Court
did
not
employ
the Lemon test; nor did it adopt any other
precise criteria to govern cases involving
legislative prayer. Instead, the decision
addressed a series of case-specific concerns

raised by the plaintiff. In fact-intensive cases
like this one, which defy exact legal
formulas, the exercise of “legal judgment” is
not the same as the exercise of “personal
judgment”; it must “reflect and remain
faithful to the underlying purposes” of the
relevant constitutional provisions, and it
must “take account of context and
consequences measured in light of those
purposes.”…
We conclude, on the record before us, that
the town's prayer practice must be viewed as
an endorsement of a particular religious
viewpoint. This conclusion is supported by
several considerations, including the prayergiver selection process, the content of the
prayers, and the contextual actions (and
inactions) of prayer-givers and town
officials. We emphasize that, in reaching
this conclusion, we do not rely on any single
aspect of the town's prayer practice, but
rather on the totality of the circumstances
present in this case….
In our view, whether a town's prayerselection
process
constitutes
an
establishment of religion depends on the
extent to which the selection process results
in a perspective that is substantially neutral
amongst creeds. The town asserts, and there
is no evidence to the contrary, that it would
have accepted any and all volunteers who
asked to give the prayer. But the town
neither publicly solicited volunteers to
deliver invocations nor informed members
of the general public that volunteers would
be considered or accepted, let alone
welcomed, regardless of their religious
beliefs or non-beliefs. Had the town publicly
opened its prayer practice to volunteers in
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this way, its selection process could be
defended more readily as random in the
relevant sense….
It is no small thing for a non-Christian (or
for a Christian, for that matter) to pray “in
the name of Jesus Christ.” Prayers delivered
in this fashion invoke “a deity in whose
divinity only those of the Christian faith
believe,” and do so to the clear exclusion of
other faiths. References to Christ as “Our
Savior” and invocations of the Holy Trinity
do the same thing.
The sectarian nature of the prayers, we
emphasize, was not inherently a problem.
The prayers in the record were not offensive
in the way identified as problematic
in Marsh: they did not preach conversion,
threaten damnation to nonbelievers,
downgrade other faiths, or the like. Prayers
of this more offensive sort might be
sufficient in themselves to give rise to an
Establishment Clause violation. But we need
not determine whether any single prayer at
issue here suffices to give such an indication
of establishment, since we find that on the
totality of the circumstances presented the
town's prayer practice identified the town
with Christianity in violation of the
Establishment Clause.
The town had an obligation to consider how
its prayer practice would be perceived by
those who attended Town Board meetings.
And, despite the homogeneity of viewpoints
reflected by the invocations, the town did
not explain that it intended the prayers to
solemnize Board meetings, rather than to
affiliate the town with any particular creed.
The town never informed prayer-givers that

invocations were not to be “exploited as an
effort to convert others to the particular faith
of the invocational speaker, nor to disparage
any faith or belief different than that of the
invocational speaker.” Absent any effort on
the part of the town to explain the nature of
its prayer program to attendees, the rare
handful of cases, over the course of a
decade, in which individuals from other
faiths delivered the invocation cannot
overcome the impression, created by the
steady drumbeat of often specifically
sectarian Christian prayers, that the town's
prayer practice associated the town with the
Christian religion.
We ascribe no religious animus to the town
or its leaders. The town's desire to mark the
solemnity of its proceedings with a prayer is
understandable; Americans have done just
that for more than two hundred years. But
when one creed dominates others—
regardless of a town's intentions—
constitutional concerns come to the fore….
Finally, it is relevant, and worthy of weight,
that most prayer-givers appeared to speak on
behalf of the town and its residents, rather
than only on behalf of themselves. Prayergivers often requested that the audience
participate, and spoke in the first-person
plural: let “us” pray, “our” savior, “we” ask,
and so on. Town officials, whether
intentionally or not, contributed to the
impression that these prayer-givers spoke on
the town's behalf. After many of the prayergivers finished their invocations, Auberger
thanked them for being “our chaplain of the
month.” There was testimony, as well, that
members of the Town Board participated in
the prayers by bowing their heads, saying

10

“Amen,” or making the sign of the Cross.
The invitation to audience members to
participate in the prayer, particularly by
physical means such as standing or bowing
their heads, placed audience members who
are nonreligious or adherents of nonChristian religion in the awkward position of
either participating in prayers invoking
beliefs they did not share or appearing to
show disrespect for the invocation,
thus further projecting the message that the
town endorsed, and expected its residents to
endorse, a particular creed.
On the record before us, taking into account
all of these contextual considerations in
concert, we reverse the grant of summary
judgment. We conclude that an objective,
reasonable person would believe that the
town's prayer practice had the effect of
affiliating the town with Christianity. In
reaching this conclusion, we underscore that
we do not rely on any single aspect of the
town's prayer practice, but rather the
interaction of the facts present in this case.
The extent to which a given act conveys the
message of affiliation, or fails to do so, will
depend on the various circumstances that
circumscribe it. Accordingly, we do not aim
to specify what the Establishment Clause
allows, but restrict ourselves to noting the
ways in which this town must be read to
have conveyed a religious affiliation….
D.
We emphasize what we do not hold. We do
not hold that the town may not open its
public meetings with a prayer or invocation.
Such legislative prayers, as Marsh holds and
as we have repeatedly noted, do not violate

the Establishment Clause. Nor do we hold
that any prayers offered in this context must
be blandly “nonsectarian.” A requirement
that town officials censor the invocations
offered—beyond the limited requirement,
recognized in Marsh, that prayer-givers be
advised that they may not proselytize for, or
disparage, particular religions—is not only
not required by the Constitution, but risks
establishing a “civic religion” of its own.
Occasional
prayers
recognizing
the
divinities or beliefs of a particular creed, in a
context that makes clear that the town is not
endorsing or affiliating itself with that creed
or, more broadly, with religion or nonreligion, are not offensive to the
Constitution. Nor are we adopting a test that
permits prayers in theory but makes it
impossible for a town in practice to avoid
Establishment Clause problems. To the
contrary, it seems to us that a practice such
as the one to which the town here apparently
aspired—one that is inclusive of multiple
beliefs and makes clear, in public word and
gesture, that the prayers offered are
presented by a randomly chosen group of
volunteers, who do not express an official
town religion, and do not purport to speak
on behalf of all the town's residents or to
compel their assent to a particular belief—is
fully compatible with the First Amendment.
What we do hold is that a legislative prayer
practice that, however well-intentioned,
conveys to a reasonable objective observer
under the totality of the circumstances an
official affiliation with a particular religion
violates the clear command of the
Establishment
Clause.
Where
the
overwhelming predominance of prayers
offered are associated, often in an explicitly
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sectarian way, with a particular creed, and
where the town takes no steps to avoid the
identification, but rather conveys the
impression that town officials themselves
identify with the sectarian prayers and that
residents in attendance are expected to
participate in them, a reasonable objective
observer would perceive such an
affiliation….

municipalities have few means to forestall
the prayer-giver who cannot resist the urge
to proselytize. These difficulties may well
prompt municipalities to pause and think
carefully before adopting legislative prayer,
but they are not grounds on which to
preclude its practice.

Ours is a society splintered, and joined, by a
wide a constellation of religious beliefs and
non-beliefs. Amidst these many viewpoints,
even a single circumstance may appear to
suggest an affiliation. To the extent that the
state cannot make demands regarding the
content of legislative prayers, moreover,

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE
the district court's grant of summary
judgment and REMAND for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. We
leave it to the district court, with the
assistance of the parties, to craft appropriate
relief.

CONCLUSION
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“Court to Rule on Government Prayer”
SCOTUS Blog
May 20, 2013
Lyle Denniston
Returning for the first time in three decades
to the constitutionality of saying prayers at
the opening of a government meeting, the
Supreme Court on Monday took on a case
involving
Town
Board
sessions
in the upstate New York community named
Greece, a city of about 100,000 people. For
years, it followed the practice of having
local clergy — mostly leaders of Christian
congregations — recite prayers to start
Town Board public meetings.
The case of Town of Greece v.
Galloway (docket 12-696) was one of five
newly granted cases, all of which will be
heard and decided in the Term starting next
October. No current member of the Court
was serving when the Court last ruled on
government prayers in the case of Marsh v.
Chambers, in 1983.
In the town of Greece, which is located in
Monroe County just outside of Rochester,
the opening prayer practice began in 1999
and continued at least through 2010, when
lower courts ruled on its validity. As the
case reached the Supreme Court in a plea by
the town, the practice had been ruled
unconstitutional by the Second Circuit
Court.
With two local residents challenging the
prayer ritual, the Circuit Court concluded
that — on the specific facts of this case
alone — the recitation by clergy had the
effect of aligning the town government

officially with a particular faith —
Christianity. The Circuit Court stressed that
it was not ruling that a local government
could never open its meetings with prayers
or a religious invocation, nor was it adopting
a specific test that would allow prayer in
theory but make it impossible in reality.
What it did rule, the Circuit Court said, was
that “a legislative prayer practice that,
however well-intentioned, conveys to a
reasonable objective observer under the
totality of the circumstances an official
affiliation with a particular religion, violates
the clear command of the [First
Amendment's] Establishment Clause.”
It emphasized that, in the situation in
Greece, New York, the overall impression of
the practice was that it was dominated by
Christian clergy and specific expressions of
Christian beliefs, and that the town officials
took no steps to try to dispel that impression.
The Supreme Court’s agreement to review
the decision might be interpreted as an
indication that the Justices could be
preparing to make a major pronouncement
on religion in the public sphere, but it also
might be understood as an intent to focus
solely on the specific facts of the practice as
it unfolded in this one community.
As the case develops, though, it almost
certainly will draw wide interest from
advocacy organizations and religious
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entities, if for no other reason than the Court
has not examined the specific question in
some thirty years. Eighteen states had
joined in urging the Court to grant review of
the new case.

state relations, and both of those cases found
invalid prayers that appeared to be
sponsored by public school officials — at
graduation ceremonies in a 1992 decision,
and at a school football game in 2000.

In the 1983 decision in Marsh v. Chambers,
the Supreme Court upheld an opening prayer
tradition at the Nebraska state legislature. It
did so, however, by relying solely upon the
tradition of legislative opening prayers that
Congress had followed since the Founding
era. In asking the Supreme Court to return
to the issue, the town of Greece argued that
the lower courts have divided deeply over
the constitutional standards to be applied to
judge such prayer exercises.

While the Court granted the new case from
the
town
of
Greece
after
its
second examination of the town’s petition,
the Court took no action once again — after
considering it a seventh time — on another
case involving religion in the public
sphere. At issue in the case of Elmbrook
School District v. Doe (12-755) is the
constitutionality of holding a high school
graduation ceremony in a church. There
has been no explanation of what the Court is
doing with that case.

Since 1983, the Court has decided only two
cases involving prayer as an issue in church-

14

“Council Prayers Get Top Court Review in Church-State Case”
Bloomberg
May 20, 2013
Greg Stohr
The U.S. Supreme Court will consider the
constitutional limits on prayers during
legislative sessions, accepting an appeal
from a New York town that starts most
council meetings with a Christian
invocation.
The justices today said they will review a
federal appeals court’s conclusion that the
Rochester suburb of Greece was improperly
affiliating itself with Christianity.
The Supreme Court ruled in 1983 that
legislative bodies could open sessions with a
prayer delivered by a state-employed
religious leader. The latest case gives the
court under Chief Justice John Roberts a
chance to reinforce that ruling and insulate
government bodies from legal challenges to
what is now a widespread practice across the
country.
“The practice of legislative prayer is firmly
embedded in the history and traditions of
this nation,” Thomas Hungar, the lead
lawyer representing the town, said in a
statement. “We hope the court will reaffirm
the settled understanding that such prayers,
offered without improper motive and in
accordance with the conscience of the
prayer-giver, are constitutional.”
The New York-based 2nd U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals said Greece’s selection process
“virtually ensured a Christian viewpoint” at
the vast majority of council meetings. Under
the informal invitation procedures then in

place, every prayer-giver from 1999 to 2007
was a Christian clergy member, the threejudge panel said.
Wiccan Priestess
After two town residents complained, nonChristians delivered the invocation at four of
the 12 board meetings in 2008. The group
included a Wiccan priestess, the chairman of
the local Baha’i congregation and a lay
Jewish man who delivered two invocations.
The appeals court also said town officials
took no steps to mitigate the impression that
the city endorsed Christianity.
“The town had an obligation to consider
how its prayer practice would be perceived
by those who attended town board
meetings,” Judge Guido Calabresi wrote for
the panel. “And, despite the homogeneity of
viewpoints reflected by the invocations, the
town did not explain that it intended the
prayers to solemnize board meetings, rather
than to affiliate the town with any particular
creed.”
The appeals court pointed to a 1989
Supreme Court ruling, County of Allegheny
v. American Civil Liberties Union, which
barred a Pennsylvania county from erecting
a Nativity scene in a courthouse.
‘Specific Faith’
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In that case, the majority said in passing that
legislative prayers are impermissible if they
“have the effect of affiliating the
government with any one specific faith or
belief.”
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote the
pivotal opinion in the 1989 case, saying the
Nativity display was an impermissible
governmental “endorsement” of religion.
The two residents challenging Greece’s
practices, Susan Galloway and Linda
Stephens, asked the Supreme Court not to
hear the appeal. Even under the 1983
decision, Marsh v. Chambers, legislative
bodies may not use prayers to “advance one
faith to the exclusion of others,” the two
women argued in court papers.

“A town council meeting isn’t a church
service, and it shouldn’t seem like one,” said
Barry W. Lynn, executive director of
Americans United for Separation of Church
and
State,
the
Washington-based
organization
behind
the
lawsuit.
“Government can’t serve everyone in the
community when it endorses one faith over
others.”
Eighteen states, led by Indiana, and 49
members of Congress joined Greece in
urging the high court to get involved.
The case, which the court will hear in the
nine-month term that starts in October, is
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 12-696.

16

“The Supreme Court Takes the Case of Town of Greece v. Galloway, Which
Raises the Question Whether – And If So, How – A Town Board May Open
Its Meetings with Prayer”
Justia
May 30, 2013
Marci A. Hamilton
The Supreme Court granted certiorari last
week in an important Establishment Clause
case, Town of Greece v. Galloway, which
poses the questions whether—and if so,
how—a local government may open its
public meetings with prayer. The fact of the
cert grant is interesting for doctrinal reasons,
of course, but so is the question of why this
Court would take such a case.
The Case of Town of Greece v. Galloway
This case is already squaring up to be a
landmark battle in the ongoing culture war
over control of government programs and
spaces, and control of American culture
generally.
Until 1999, the Town of Greece opened its
Town Board meetings with a moment of
silence, a practice that is unquestionably
constitutional. In 1999, however, the
practice changed, when the Town
Supervisor, John Auberger, substituted
prayer for silence. According to Auberger’s
Town profile, he is a member of St.
Lawrence Roman Catholic Church and the
Knights of Columbus, and virtually all of the
monthly
“chaplains”
have
been
Christian. The Town and Auberger have
allied themselves with the most extreme
proponents of government-sponsored prayer.
They have the Alliance Defense Fund
representing them, and an amicus brief has

been filed on their behalf by the Foundation
for Moral Law. (That foundation is led by
Judge Roy Moore, who belligerently
violated the Establishment Clause by
bringing his own two-ton granite rendition
of a version of the Ten Commandments into
the lobby of the Alabama Supreme Court).
Other amici include the Liberty Institute and
the National Legal Foundation, which
advertises itself as a “Christian public
interest law firm”. It is no secret that these
groups are aggressively seeking to reintroduce prayer in public schools, a
movement that includes many who insist
that this is a “Christian country.”
The Town of Greece has moved backward,
if you measure what they did in comparison
to how the constitutional doctrine has
developed. Once the Supreme Court held
that public schools could not sponsor prayer,
the alternative substituted was a moment of
silence. The former was exclusionary, but
the new practice sent no message to the
participants that the government expected
them to follow any particular creed. With
the constantly expanded galaxy of beliefs in
the United States, this was a salutary
development for liberty and peace.
There is no indication why Supervisor
Auberger decided to displace the likely
constitutional moment of silence with
constitutionally
suspect
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prayer. Under Wallace v. Jaffree, a moment
of silence might be constitutional, but not if
it was packaged as a moment of “meditation
and voluntary prayer.” In light of his own
bio on the Town website, he is a believer
and a Christian. We can never learn motive,
but what is the purpose of displacing a
moment of silence with prayer in 1999, if
not to underscore a purpose of supporting,
endorsing, and propagating religion? The
time line in this case does not bode well for
Greece.
The procedures are also suspect and fraught
with the potential for the Town to impose
religious content and viewpoint on its
citizens. The Town of Greece solicited
clergy month-by-month, by calling those
religious groups (all Christian) listed in a
Chamber of Commerce publication. Calls
were made by a Town employee until a
member of the clergy was found to open the
next
monthly
session.
Sometimes,
Supervisor Auberger gave the chaplain of
the month a plaque or special
commendation. Again, these practices were
arbitrary and unilateral.
By and large, the prayers have been
delivered solely by Christian clergy, except
for a blip of time that—not coincidentally—
fell in the midst of the litigation where they
recruited a Wiccan priestess, a Baha’i
congregation leader, and a secular Jew. By
the close of the record, though, they were
back to a purely Christian contingent of
chaplains, who frequently invoked Jesus,
God, and the Holy Spirit.

the
public
Town
Board
meetings. Americans United for Separation
of Church and State represents Galloway
and Stephens. Their claims sound in Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor’s endorsement test,
for Galloway and Stephens argue that the
Town appeared to have aligned itself with a
single religious tradition, Christianity, and
that the government’s endorsement of
Christianity is a violation of the separation
of church and state, as that principle has
been interpreted in Establishment Clause
doctrine. Under existing doctrine, they are
on solid ground.
First Amendment Religion
Weighs Against the Town

Doctrine

The facts are pretty stark here. A religious
town supervisor decided that a moment of
silence was not enough, and instead
embroiled the town in likely litigation by
recruiting chaplains to start Town Board
meetings with sectarian prayers. Moreover,
the vast majority of recruited chaplains over
the years have shared the same faith as the
supervisor. And no citizen or resident could
attend the Board Meetings without being
subjected to the prayers.
Under the First Amendment, it is incumbent
upon the government not to endorse a single
religion, and not to choose between religion
and irreligion. These are well-settled
principles, and they have contributed to the
remarkable achievement in the United States
of simultaneous expanding diversity of
religious belief and a lack of religious civil
wars.

This practice was challenged by Susan
Galloway and Linda Stephens, who attended
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The one case that might potentially cut on
the side of the Town is Marsh v. Chambers.
There, the Court held that opening prayers in
a state legislature were constitutional,
largely because of the long history of
opening
legislative
sessions
with
prayer. The Court reasoned, as it had
in Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York,
which upheld property tax exemptions for
religious groups, that a practice that had
been in place since the beginning of the
country and had not resulted in an
established church must not be a violation of
the Constitution. The Court did not,
however,
otherwise
address
its
Establishment Clause doctrine, which must
be applied in this case, where the prayers
were not initiated until 1999. In cases
like Town of Greece, the Court will have to
use its standard Establishment Clause
doctrine, which is found in the factors listed
in Lemon v. Kurtzman and later cases
interpreting those factors.
On the other side, there are many Supreme
Court cases addressing government support
or preference for religion that spell trouble
for the Town. In Allegheny County v.
ACLU, the Court held that the county could
not place a nativity, or crèche, scene on the
Grand Staircase of the county courthouse,
because it sent a message of endorsement of
Christianity.
The
school
cases
are
also
instructive. In Engel v. Vitale, the Court
held that public schools could not deliver a
prayer each day to the students. And
in Stone v. Graham, public schools were not
permitted to post the Ten Commandments in

every classroom, where there was no secular
purpose to do so.
In Lee v. Weisman, in a decision authored by
Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court held
that a public school could not include a
prayer at graduation, because it endorsed a
religious tradition, and left students in the
audience feeling as though they were not
full members of the community. The same
reasoning was embraced in Santa Fe
Independent School Dist v. Doe, where the
Court invalidated a Texas public school’s
practice of having students present prayers
over the public announcement system as part
of the program immediately preceding
football games.
Both of the latter cases, Lee and Santa Fe,
highlighted the plight of the student, or
citizen, who is caught at a public event, but
who does not subscribe to the religious
views being propagated by the government
at that event. The cases convey an easily
understandable principle: it is unacceptable,
under the Constitution, for the government
to deliver a message on behalf of a religious
viewpoint, in part because it marginalizes
those who don’t share the same
perspective. Underlying that principle is
that national citizenship entails inclusion,
regardless of belief or creed. To put it
another way, religious entities have the
right, under the First Amendment to create
insiders and outsiders within their own faith,
but the government may not do the
same. We are all Americans with the same
government, regardless of our faith. The
drive for government-sponsored prayer is a
drive for division, and, therefore, a danger.
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Galloway and Stephens were receiving, loud
and clear, a message from the Town
Supervisor and the Board that if they wanted
to exercise their rights as citizens to monitor
and speak to their government, then they
first had to sit through the Supervisor’s
decision to impose a prayer at the start of the
meeting.

they have embraced the idea it is a
monotheistic country. In other words, they
have had to concede that there is meaningful
diversity in America, going beyond the
diversity among Christians, but they have
held fast, so far, to the concept that all the
“major” religions are united in worshiping a
single deity.

This
Supreme
Court
Establishment Clause

The problem for these four conservative
Justices is that we are long past the moment
in history when the Court could plausibly or
legitimately state, let alone hold, that this is
just a “monotheistic country.” The diversity
of religious belief in the United States is
nearly boundless, with sects numbering in
the tens of thousands, and new schisms and
believers appearing daily. It is rank denial
to insist that the millions of Buddhists and
Hindus in the country are “monotheists,” not
to mention the growing numbers of Pagan
believers, and just as important for these
purposes, the growing number of spiritual
believers who do not embrace organized
religion. We have established a spectrum
and variety of religious experience that is
unrivaled in history, and we have done it
without raising arms against each other.
“Monotheism”
mischaracterizes
the
American religious experience, and in fact,
falsifies it.

and

the

Under most constitutional metrics, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was
correct in holding that the Town of Greece’s
practice
was
likely
unconstitutional. Normally, the Supreme
Court does not take cases that pose settled
questions of law. Therefore, the question
that this certiorari grant raises is why this
Court took it.
I hope the answer is not because the
conservative members of the Court intend to
be judicial activists intent on rolling back
the principle of government neutrality
toward religion. Most court watchers would
assume that there may be four conservative
members of the Court who are inclined to
jettison the endorsement test, Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito, and who would embrace the agendas
of the Alliance Defense Fund, and others
who are backing the Town in this case. I
also hope that the fact they are all Catholic
does not lead them, consciously or
unconsciously, to be more sympathetic to
the Town Supervisor in this case.
While even they have necessarily abandoned
the notion that this is a “Christian country,”

Indeed, in an era of Islamic terrorism, which
exists to impose its religious viewpoint on
the world and is offended by the religious
liberty and diversity of the world, it is hard
to explain why anyone still thinks that
government control or support of a
particular religion makes sense. We need
individual and personal liberty, but what we
also need to do is set an example for the
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world of why the totalitarianism at the heart
of Islamic radicalism is so wrong.
Justice Kennedy, as usual now, likely will
be a swing vote. He authored Lee, and
labeled the constitutional violation in that
case “coercion,” but his opinion read very
much like the Court’s endorsement test,
making it highly unlikely that he will
abandon the test in substance. He took
seriously in that case the reality that a
captive audience attending a graduation
ceremony could not be made to feel like
non-citizens consistent with the First
Amendment. The same principle applies to
the Town resident who wants to attend the
Town Board meetings to monitor
governance, but not to participate in
religion. There is no other venue in which
to obtain the same information, and so they
are trapped in a very real sense. Giving up
attending the public meetings of one’s local
government is too much for the government
to ask of those who don’t share the religious
viewpoint of the government-sponsored
speaker, or any religious viewpoint at all.
I assume the four more liberal members of
the Court, Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan, will be more likely

to find that the endorsement test is
appropriate and violated in these
circumstances, and that the Establishment
Clause is essential to liberty and
safety. Justice Kagan did raise eyebrows
when she joined Justice Alito in HosannaTabor when he wrote in favor of
“autonomy” for religious organizations,
which is an extremist position at odds with
the ordered liberty imposed by the First
Amendment
doctrine
from
the
beginning.
But that decision and
concurrence is so far removed from this
case, that vote reveals little.
What is at stake in Town of Greece is our
self-image
of
ourselves
as
a
collective. Those in favor of permitting
local governments to open their public
meetings with predominantly Christian
messages have myopia or a sort of body
image disorder. They simply are not seeing
what is in front of them. If the Justices
accept the actual diversity of the United
States and the need of government in these
difficult times to eschew taking sides on
faith, the holding in this case will be
inevitable: the Town of Greece has violated
the Establishment Clause.
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“2nd Circuit Finds NY Town Prayers Unconstitutional”
Thomson Reuters News & Insight
May 17, 2012
Terry Baynes
A federal appeals court on Thursday revived
a challenge against the town of Greece in
upstate New York over its policy of holding
opening prayers at town board meetings.

favor before a trial, finding that town
employees did not intentionally exclude any
particular faiths and did not restrict the
content of the prayers.

The New York-based U.S. Court of Appeals
for the 2nd Circuit found that the prayer
policy aligned the town with Christianity in
violation of the Establishment Clause, which
prevents the government from favoring one
religion over another.

But the 2nd Circuit panel reversed that
decision on Thursday, finding that the
town’s process for selecting speakers
virtually ensured a Christian viewpoint.
Even though most of the congregations in
Greece were Christian, the town could have
invited clergy from outside its borders, the
panel found.

"The town’s desire to mark the solemnity of
its proceedings with a prayer is
understandable; Americans have done just
that for more than two hundred years. But
when one creed dominates others -regardless of a town’s intentions -constitutional concerns come to the fore,"
Judge Guido Calabresi wrote for a
unanimous three-judge panel.
Two Greece residents, Susan Galloway and
Linda Stephens, complained in 2007 that the
town board only invited Christian clergy to
deliver the invocation. The next year, the
town invited a Wiccan priestess, a chairman
of a local Baha'i congregation and a lay
Jewish man to give the prayer. But prayers
at eight of the 12 meetings were Christian.
Galloway and Stephens sued the town and
its supervisor in 2008, challenging the
prayer practice under the Establishment
Clause. The district court ruled in the town’s

Joel Oster of the Alliance Defense Fund,
which represents Greece, said the town was
prepared to appeal the case as far as the
Supreme Court.
"The court wants the town to be prayer
monitors, to determine how many prayers in
Jesus' name are too many," he said. That
outcome violates the Establishment Clause,
he said. Oster pointed to a 2008 ruling by
the 11th Circuit in Pelphrey v. Cobb County,
Georgia, upholding a county commission's
opening prayer policy.
But Ayesha Khan, a lawyer with Americans
United for Separation of Church and State
who represented the plaintiffs before the 2nd
Circuit, said the prayer givers in Cobb
County were more diverse than in Greece.
"Municipalities need to ensure that no single
religion is advanced in their prayers, and
22

they have to take a fairly active role in
ensuring constitutional compliance," she
said.

Forsyth County, leaving in place a 4th
Circuit ruling that stopped sectarian prayers
at county board meetings.

In a different case in January, the U.S.
Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal by

The 2nd Circuit case is Galloway et al v.
Town of Greece et al, No. 10-3635.
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“What Should the Supreme Court do With Town Board Prayers in Galloway
v. Town of Greece?”
Verdict
June 7, 2013
Vikram David Amar & Alan E. Brownstein
Last week the U.S. Supreme Court granted
review in an important case involving the
First
Amendment’s
Establishment
Clause, Galloway
v.
Town
of
Greece. Galloway involves a decade-pluslong practice in the upstate New York Town
of Greece of starting Town Board meetings
with a short prayer. Before 1999, the Town
(which has slightly fewer than 100,000
residents) began Board meetings with a
moment of silence. But since then, it has
been inviting local clergy to offer an
opening prayer after the Pledge of
Allegiance has been recited. Prayer-givers
deliver their prayer over the Board’s public
address system, and many have asked
members of the audience to bow their heads,
stand, or join in the prayer during its
recitation. The Town asserts that anyone—
followers of any religion, agnostics, and
atheists alike—can request to offer an
invocation, and that it has never turned
down any request. But in practice, Christian
clergy have given nearly all the prayers
since 1999, and have been invited to do so
by the Town, which often calls them
“chaplain[s] of the month.”
As fellow Verdict columnist Marci
Hamilton pointed out last week in her
analysis of this case, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit (with
esteemed Judge Guido Calabresi writing)
invalidated the Town’s practice, finding that
the prayers, in context, had to be understood

as a public endorsement of Christianity,
which violated the First Amendment’s ban
on laws respecting an establishment of
religion. We agree with much of Judge
Calabresi’s reasoning, but in the space
below we offer additional reasons—ones we
feel the Second Circuit did not adequately
explore—to be skeptical about what the
Town has been doing.
The Town of Greece’s Practice Does
Implicate Religious Equality Values
Disputes about the recitation of prayers
before town board or city council meetings
implicate many values underlying the
Establishment Clause. The Second Circuit’s
opinion, which focused on the so-called
endorsement test, spoke primarily in terms
of religious equality. And there are
powerful equality-based grounds for
challenging the town of Greece’s
government-sponsored prayers. For these
constitutional purposes, equality means not
only equality in material benefits but also
equality of status and respect. This has been
clear since the Court declared in Brown v.
Board
of
Education that
physically
comparable but separate public schools that
are segregated by race violated the equal
protection clause because of the message of
inferior status they communicated to
African-American
children.
When
government bodies select leaders of
majoritarian religions to lead sectarian
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prayers to open local governmental
proceedings, while ignoring the beliefs of
other citizens, the message of lack of worth
and disrespect for minority religions and the
non-religious would be hard to avoid.
To be sure, there is nothing intrinsically
disrespectful about being asked to stand
while prayers of a different faith than our
own are being offered. Most of us have
probably been asked to do so when
attending a wedding, bar mitzvah or other
religious event in the house of worship of
neighbors and friends. In those situations,
however, we are guests in the sanctuary of a
different faith community. As outsiders, we
do not expect our different religious
identities to be recognized. There is no
pretense that the rituals being observed
reflect our own religious commitments. But
citizens of a town or city are not guests and
outsiders at the public meetings of their
government. They belong to the political
community and, quite reasonably, resent
being treated as strangers who are not being
shown the same respect afforded to its
favored members.
And the Town has been essentially
discriminating against minority religious
voices. By focusing on majoritarian sects—
the Town drew some prayer leaders from a
list of congregations printed in the Chamber
of Commerce’s directory—the Town
effectively excluded religious adherents who
live in the Town but who lack the numbers
to establish a physical congregation within
the community. Oftentimes, as in the area
surrounding UC Davis, where we both teach
law, religious practitioners may have an
insufficient number of members to establish

a congregation in their own town, and for
that reason they worship in a congregation
in a neighboring town. But if each town
used only a directory of congregations
located within that town as the source of
clergy to be invited to lead prayers at Board
meetings, many religions would be left out.
Equality Is Not the Only Establishment
Clause Value at Stake Here, the Town
Councils Differ from State Legislatures
As powerful as the equality concerns in this
case are, they should not cause us to
overlook the important religious liberty
concerns that are also raised in this dispute.
Plaintiffs argued that the prayers at Board
meetings were coercive, but the Second
Circuit opinion, construing these arguments
to be focused only on children, quickly
rejected these claims in a footnote. Plaintiffs
were adults, the court reasoned, and the
prayers at the Town Board meeting here
were no more coercive than the prayers
offered at sessions of the Nebraska state
legislature that the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld against an Establishment Clause
challenge in Marsh v. Chambers in 1983.
We think the court was far too quick to
dismiss these religious liberty concerns on
the authority of the Marsh decision.
There are critical distinctions between city
councils and state legislatures that produce
very different kinds of audiences who attend
the meetings of these different government
bodies. Most of what a state legislature does
involves the formulation and enactment of
general legislation that impacts large groups
and constituencies. There may be some
narrow bills that address limited issues, but
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the majority of the state legislature’s work
relates to laws of significant breadth and
scope. By contrast, the work of a city
council, in most of the towns and cities of
the United States, regularly deals with
decisions affecting small groups and
individuals. Land-use decisions impact
individual neighbors and neighborhoods.
Funding decisions may burden particular
small constituencies. Often town councils
and boards act as administrative tribunals in
a quasi- adjudicatory capacity, hearing
personnel grievances or land use appeals.
Thus, these local government meetings are
much more likely to be focused on particular
individuals than are the general laws that
state legislatures consider at their sessions.
Moreover, and related to these differences,
citizens who watch the deliberations of the
state legislature from the gallery are almost
always
passive
observers
of
the
government’s functions. They have no role
to play in the legislative process. Citizens
who attend city council meetings do so for
very different reasons. Usually they are not
passive witnesses attending the sessions to
be better informed about government
operations. They attend council meetings to
participate in government by speaking to the
Council during public comment periods.
They want and expect to be seen and heard
by the Council. Their goal is to influence
decisionmakers, not to simply observe or
monitor them. For that reason, the ability to
address the Council in person is an
important right of political participation.
Finally, outside of major metropolitan areas,
there are stark difference between the size
and format of state legislative chambers and

sessions, and those of city councils. State
legislators rarely know who is sitting in their
legislative galleries. The size of the
chambers and the number of legislators and
visitors preclude any such knowledge or
sense of familiarity. Not so, in the small
meeting rooms of a city council, where the
physical proximity between the Council and
the audience and the limited number of
participants make it far easier for Council
members to be aware of their audience.
Because of these differences, the decision
in Marsh tells us very little about the
coercive nature of government-sponsored
prayer at city council meetings. In the
setting of a city council meeting, citizens
who wish to address the council are coerced
when they are asked to stand or otherwise
affirm the prayer that is being offered in
their name. A failure to comply would risk
alienating the very political decisionmakers
whom they hope to influence.
The Town of Greece provides a good
illustration. Citizens there who feel
excluded and burdened by the Board
meeting’s prayers have no good alternatives.
They can try to arrive at the council session
after the pledge and prayer have been
completed—but they may stand out in a
small council meeting room for doing so. It
would be even more awkward to stay and
recite the pledge and affirm their loyalty to
our country, leave for the prayer, and then
return after the prayer is over. Or they can
sacrifice their religious liberty by agreeing
to have someone appointed by the
government pray in their name. Visitors
sitting in the gallery at the state legislature
experience no such vulnerability or pressure.
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Why the School Analogy Doesn’t
Undercut Galloway’s Liberty Claims
Some commentators and jurists point to the
school setting and argue that it suggests that
coercion-based arguments depend upon the
malleability of the listener. They read the
school cases for the proposition that statesponsored prayer is unconstitutional in the
context of public schools only because
children, on account of their age and
maturity, are uniquely susceptible to
indoctrination and the pressure to
conform. By contrast, adults attending city
council meetings, it is suggested, should be
capable of withstanding such compulsions.
This argument is unpersuasive. The major
problem with religious coercion is not that it
may actually change people’s religious
beliefs and practices. It is that when
religious individuals defy the state’s
coercive efforts, they suffer burdens and
penalties for doing so. Religious coercion is
as unconstitutional when it fails as it is when
it succeeds.
Prayer in the public schools is distinctively
problematic, but not just because it is
directed at children. It is particularly
dangerous
because
teachers
and
administrators have so much discretionary
power over the students in their charge. Both
students and their parents know that it is
treacherous to alienate school personnel
because retaliation is so easy to mete out and
hard to prove.
Citizens attending city council meetings for
the purpose of influencing the council’s
decision confront a similar burden that does
not dissipate with age or maturity. The

decisions of a city council often involve
substantial political discretion in weighing
the competing concerns of relatively small
constituencies. Citizens who refuse to join in
prayers offered by clergy invited by the
council risk overtly or subconsciously
retaliatory rulings.
A Final, Particular Way in Which the
Town of Greece’s Practice Offends
Liberty
The Town of Greece’s approach to public
prayer at issue in this case involves a
particularly egregious affront to religious
liberty. There are at least two kinds of
prayers that an organization may use to
begin a session or meeting. In one kind of
prayer, the speaker prays in his or her own
name for G-d’s blessing to be given for the
meeting and its participants. There is a
religious liberty issue implicated here, in
that individuals may feel that they should
not be required to be present while a prayer
is expressed. The weight of that burden may
be somewhat mitigated, however, by the fact
that many people do not experience the fact
that someone else is offering a prayer for
their well-being as a burden on their
liberty—even if the person who is doing the
praying is of a different faith.
But a far greater affront to religious liberty
occurs when the second kind of prayer is
undertaken. In this kind of prayer, the
speaker claims to be offering a collective
prayer expressing the beliefs of the
audience, a collectivity to which audience
members are asked to acquiesce by standing
or bowing their heads. The decision about
when and how to speak to G-d, and the
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words one chooses in that expression,
belong to the individual. It is an
extraordinary intrusion into the religious
liberty of the individual for the state to usurp
those decisions. The state cannot tell people
that as a condition to attending and
commenting during a city council meeting,
they have to delegate to the state the power
to appoint someone to pray to G-d in their
name.
This basic commitment to personal religious
autonomy is the foundation of the American
understanding of religious liberty. When
colonial proponents of religious liberty
argued that religious freedom was an
inalienable right, they were speaking
literally, not figuratively. It made no sense
to suggest that a person could somehow
surrender his relationship with and duty to
G-d to a government official, or to anyone
else for that matter. Throughout the Great

Awakening and continuing on to the
ratification of the Constitution, advocates of
religious liberty insisted on the right of the
individual to choose who would minister to
his or her spiritual needs and lead him or her
in worship. Established religions violated
these principles of religious liberty—and
thereby prompted the First Amendment—
precisely because they employed the
coercive power of government to influence
the private judgment of the individual in
matters of religion.
Coercive collective prayer at city council
meetings undermines religious equality by
discriminating against minority faiths. And
it abridges religious liberty by insinuating
the state into the individual’s relationship
with G-d and compelling people to engage
in prayer that lacks personal authenticity.
The Constitution prohibits the state from
engaging in such practices.
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